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Abstract:  Rule-governed  behavior  has  long  been  associated  with  generating
insensitivity  to  direct  contingencies  of  reinforcement.  This  insensitivity  to
environmental changes has also been implicated in human psychological suffering.
From a behavior analytic perspective, rule-following is a verbal behavior, and thus
has been suggested to be potentially affected by the level of coherence within the
verbal stimuli involved. In this explorative study, 216 participants received a rule
that differed in terms of its coherence based on experimental training. The active
conditions did not  differ  significantly in rule  persistency,  but  differed from the
control condition that was less rule-persistent.  Rule-persistence was found to be
significantly correlated with stress and anxiety in the control condition. A post-hoc
interpretation of the findings is provided.
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Since  the  claim  that  behavior  analysis  failed  to  explain  the  development  and
complexity of human language (Chomsky, 1959), a post-Skinnerian take on verbal behavior
was  developed in  an  attempt  to  grapple  with  this  shortcoming.  This  approach  has  since
unveiled and explained many elements  in  language and cognition that  had been thus  far
unexplained  and  unavailable  to  experimental  analysis  with  operant  and  respondent
conditioning alone (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, Biglan & Zettle, 2016). The ability to relate and
respond to stimuli  based on arbitrary properties,  such as for example choosing gold over
silver, was posited as a core property of human language that made extrapolation from animal
studies  kittle.  Perhaps  most  importantly  was  the  discovery of  what  was termed  stimulus
equivalence (e.g. Sidman, 1971; see Sidman, 1994 for a book length review). That is, the
phenomenon by which a small number of trained and reinforced responses (e.g. that gold is
more valuable than silver) was also seen to generate a number of untrained, unreinforced
responses (e.g. silver is less valuable than gold) (Sidman & Tailby, 1982). Furthermore, the
trained  and  emergent  untrained  responses  may also  be  accompanied  by a  change  in  the
function of the stimuli involved, making gold more desirable than silver for example, and
vice versa.
 
Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding
 
From the growing research on stimulus equivalence emerged a new modern theory of
human language and cognition known as  Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes & Roche, 2001). RFT suggested that if stimulus equivalence was a type of operant,
then  perhaps  it  constituted  but  one  type  of  generalized  operant  of  arbitrarily  applicable
relational responding (AARR), an approach that could then more adequately begin to explain
the complexity and generativity of human language and give rise to a rich new program of
research (O'Connor, Farrell, Munnelly & McHugh, 2017). If this was indeed the case and
stimulus  equivalence  was  a  generalized  operant,  then  an  extended  history  of  relevant
reinforced exemplars would serve to give rise to different patterns of relational units, the
basic unit of which was defined as the relational frame (Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes,
2000). RFT put the relational frame as the basic operant unit involved in verbal behavior, i.e.
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the behavior of relating stimuli to one another in a certain way based on arbitrary properties
(e.g. value), rather than solely non-arbitrary properties (e.g. hardness) (Hayes et al.). More
informally,  an  arbitrary  relation  could  be  established  between  stimuli  based  on  socially
determined  qualities  rather  than  purely physical  qualities.  Furthermore,  specific  kinds  of
relational frames,  such as “more than” or “the same as” constituted different subtypes of
AARR (Hayes et al., 2016).
Subsequent experimental investigation empirically supported three core properties of
AARRing, that constituted the basic features of verbal behavior (Törneke, 2014): 1) mutual
entailment (if  A is  related  to  B,  then  B becomes  related  to  A,  2)  combinatorial  mutual
entailment (if  A is  related B and B is  related to C, then A becomes related to  C, and C
becomes related to A) and 3) transformation of stimulus function (the functions of the related
stimuli  are transformed based upon the types of relations into which those stimuli  enter).
Experimental research has thus far identified several types of relational frames: coordination,
distinction, hierarchical, comparison, deistical, causal, opposition, spatial and temporal (e.g.
Luciano, Rodrigquez, Manas & Ruiz, 2009; Törneke, 2014; Hayes & Gregg, 2001).
More recent developments within RFT have given rise to a multi-dimensional multi-
level  (MDML)  framework  for  analyzing  the  dynamics  of  AARR  (see  Barnes-Holmes,
Barnes-Holmes, Luciano & McEnteggart, 2017 for a full length treatment of the MDML).
This framework puts forward that AAAR can be thought of as occurring across 5 levels of
relational development (mutual entailment, relational framing, relational networking, relating
relations,  and  relating  relational  networks)  and  4  dimensions  (derivation,  complexity,
coherence, and flexibility) that interact with each other in a dynamic fashion. Thus, relational
responding  can  be  analyzed  functionally  along  these  levels  and  dimensions.  Flexibility
concerns the degree to which an AARR can be modified by a current contextual cue, such as
“it´s the other way around” when someone is being told they are wrong. Complexity concerns
the level of detail within a pattern of AARR. For example, A equals B is less complex than A
is  better  than  B  since  the  later  also  implies  that  B  is  worse  than  A (through  mutual
entailment). Derivation concerns how well trained an AARR is. The first time stimuli are
related, derivation is high since that specific relational response has not been derived before
and  is  therefore  novel  or  emergent.  The  more  times  this  response  is  made,  the  lower
derivation will become. An example would be the first time someone is learning a word in a
novel language, relating a new word to a known word. The more this relation is repeated–
relating a novel word to a known word–the more the level of derivation decreases. Finally,
coherence refers to how predictable an AARR is based on the prior learning history of the
individual. An individual AARRing is considered coherent if the verbal stimuli in the derived
relation are related consistently with what was previously learned (Hayes et al., 2016). The
higher the coherence of a specific AARR, the higher the probability of that AARR occurring,
and  vice  versa.  More  informally,  coherence  refers  to  how correct  something  is.  Among
individuals with a history of relating gold as being more valuable than silver, being told the
opposite would be deemed incoherent with that verbal history and might be corrected or
punished. Coherence could therefore be seen as central to communication – the words used
need to be correct, or “make sense” for language to have any bearing (Hayes et al., 2016).
 
Coherence
 
Following the tradition of behavior analysis, the coherence of an AARR is understood
from a specific speaker and its context rather than in itself. For example, a certain group may
have  a  narrative  that  may  be  coherent  in  their  context,  but  that  is  incoherent  with  the
narratives of other groups (Hammack, 2011), as when different groups have different stories
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of the creation, all being coherent in themselves, but incoherent in between. In a similar way,
a person may have a self-narrative that is coherent with the network itself (e.g. coherent with
the relational network in which it participates for that individual),  but incoherent with how
others speak about that person. For example, a person with social anxiety may be viewed by
others as being socially skilled, while the socially anxious person themselves may think of
him- or herself as being a social failure.
While coherence has been suggested to be a key dimension/aspect of verbal behavior,
few  studies  have  investigated  it  per  se.  However,  previous  research  has  indicated  that
individuals tend to revert back to previously coherent ways of relating stimuli when faced
with  situations  in  which  coherent  responding  is  not  possible  (Leonhard  & Hayes,  1991;
Pilgrim & Galizio, 1995; Stewart, Stewart & Hughes, 2016; Wilson & Hayes, 1996). In other
words, coherence may function as a form of heuristic, or a confirmatory bias that guides
people towards responding in a way that is consistent with previous information or behavior
(Quinones & Hayes, 2014; Chater & Loewenstein, 2016). This suggests that coherence may
function as a generalized reinforcer for AARR in and of itself (Brodieri et al., 2015; Wray et
al., 2012). In support of this claim, the related concept of sense-making (defined broadly as
finding meaning and coherence within and between events) seems to emerge in the absence
of external reinforcement (Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Kelley,
1973; Skinner, 1936; Starr & Katlin, 1969; Harrison & Green, 1990; Peterson & Seligman,
1984).  Informally speaking, sense-making in itself  seems to be rewarding (Villatte  et  al.,
2017). This is perhaps not surprising given that in the social environment, language need to
make sense to have any bearing (Blackledge, Moran & Ellis, 2009). Over time, individuals
are rewarded for speaking coherently about events and punished for speaking incoherently.
Also, there seem to be a preference for contexts in which coherent responding is possible
(Bordieri et al., 2015). Since coherence seem to be established as being rewarding in itself,
this may explain why coherent AARRing may persist even though it its aversive (Wray et al.,
2012; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), which has been suggested to influence and maintain
psychological suffering (Villatte et al.). Furthermore, it has been argued that it is more so that
non-coherent responding is aversive (Roche et al., 2001).
Perhaps because finding coherence (i.e. identifying relevant relations among a series
of events) can increase effective behavior such as problem solving and prevention of harm
(Stewart et al., 2016), generating coherence, i.e. engaging in sense making, has been found to
be  associated  with  positive  psychological  outcomes  (Bird  &  Reese,  2006;  McAdams,
Reynolds, Lewis, Patten & Bowman, 2001; see Mineka & Henderson, 1985 for a review).
But despite its positive effects, it has also been associated with some downsides (Borkovec,
Robinson, Pruzinsky & Depree, 1983; see Watkins, 2008, for a review). This may again be
explained with coherence being a generalized reinforcer that maintains behavior despite its
aversive  outcomes.  In  other  words,  an  individual  may prioritize  coherence  over  whether
coherence actually produces desirable outcomes (Villatte et al., 2017).
Several  other  theories  have  also  thus  far  attempted  to  deal  with  the  subject  of
coherence.  For  example,  consistency  theory  argues  that  humans  have  a  preference  for
consistency, for example between behaviors and values (Grawe, 2007; Simon & Holyoak,
2002).  Inconsistency  is  experienced  as  aversive  and  steps  are  taken  to  re-establish
consistency. One of the more prominent inconsistency theories, cognitive dissonance theory,
explains how people adjust either behavior or attitudes to restore consistency, which also has
been conceptualized from behavior analysis: "Festinger and colleagues’ (1957) classic studies
on cognitive dissonance provide more directly applied and well-controlled evidence for the
notion  that  incoherent  framing  can  function  as  an  aversive,  and  coherent  framing  as  a
reinforcer." (Blackledge et al. 2009, p. 245). Also, research on the concept of confabulation
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displays the propensity to make up seemingly coherent explanations for things that cannot
possibly be explained, without the intention to lie (e.g. Fotopoulou, 2008).
 
Rule-Governed Behavior
 
Rule-governed  behavior  (RGB)  has  traditionally  been  conceptualized  as  behavior
controlled by antecedent verbal stimuli, without any apparent shaping contingencies (Törneke
et  al.,  2008).  This  can  explain  why  humans  can  engage  in  behavior  that  has  not  been
previously reinforced. The original treatment of RGB within behavior analysis was provided
by BF Skinner (1966) and dealt with rules as a method of problem solving. When facing a
problem, defined as a situation demanding a behavior that has not previously been reinforced,
a person could solve the problem by generating and following a rule. As mentioned, RFT has
strived to develop a functional analytic account of human language and cognition, one area of
which is RGB (Hayes et al., 2001). From an RFT standpoint, a rule refers to a “relational
network”,  that  is,  a  bundle  of  interconnected  stimuli  that  typically  specify  the  context,
temporal  antecedent  and topography of a  specific  behavior,  the consequence that  will  be
delivered,  and  when  those  consequences  are  to  be  delivered  (Hayes  et  al.,  2016).  For
example: “if I train hard for the upcoming competition, I might win the gold medal”. RGB
enables people to learn without having to contact direct contingencies of reinforcement. As an
extension, this type of behavior has also been seen to produce human schedule insensitivity,
or what has often been termed the ‘insensitivity effect’. That is, behaving in a manner that
deviates from the current direct contingencies of reinforcement, a behavior not observed in
non-human animals.  While  this  can be extremely beneficial   (e.g.  enduring physical  pain
when training, given that winning a gold medal has reinforcing functions for that individual;
inhibiting aggression; future planning) it also has dark sides that have been implicated in
human psychopathology (Hayes, Zettle & Rosenfarb, 1989; Törneke, Luciano & Salas, 2008;
McAuliffe, Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2014).
    The potential of RGB to make individuals insensitive to changes in their direct
environment  has  been  readily  observed  experimentally  for  some  decades  (e.g.  Vaughan,
1989).  As  mentioned  previously,  there  is  a  known difference  between  humans  and non-
humans in this regard (e.g. Bentall, Lowe & Beasty, 1985; Lowe, Beasty & Bentall, 1983),
indicating  that  human  verbal  behavior  creates  an  important  species  difference  (Catania,
Shimoff & Matthews, 1989) giving rise to this insensitivity effect - an effect that has also
been implicated in clinically relevant behavior, such anxious avoidance (Dymond, Bennett,
Boyle, Roche & Schlund, 2017; Törneke, 2014). For example, after hearing about the public
humiliation of a friend, someone may derive and follow rules on how to avoid social anxiety
provoking  situations.  For  example,  “if  I  avoid  speaking  in  front  of  others,  I  won’t  be
humiliated”. Even though the rule may be accurate insofar as speaking in front of others may
cause some anxiety, it may not cause as much anxiety as expected and may also come with
positive consequences, such as praise. More informally, rules describe consequences that are
unknown and possibly incorrect,  but the imagined consequences still  exert influence over
behavior.
 
RGB and Psychopathology
 
There  are  some  previous  studies  on  RGB  and  psychopathology.  For  example,
Rosenfarb and colleagues (1993) compared depressed and non-depressed individuals in RGB.
They found that depressed individuals were less contingency sensitive than non-depressed. A
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tentative  conclusion  was  that  individuals  with  depression  are  less  weary  about  doing  a
favorable impression on others (as  in following their  rules),  and that  they’ve historically
received  less  reinforcement  from  their  social  context.  Another  study  investigating  the
interaction between depressive  symptomatology and RGB was conducted by Baruch and
colleagues  (2007).  Dysphoric  individuals  displayed  greater  contingency  sensitivity  than
individuals  with  non-dysphoric  participants.  Contrary,  McAuliffe  and  colleagues  (2014)
found that individuals with high self reported depression symptoms was more rule-governed
compared to those with low self reported depressive symptoms when given an inaccurate
instruction.  However,  the  somewhat  different  designs  in  between  these  studies  make  it
difficult to do draw any conclusions.
    While RGB is thought to contribute to important aspects of psychopathology, and
derived  stimulus  relations  have  already  been  used  to  explain  some  aspects  of
psychopathology, there is a lack of basic experimental research combining these two areas
(Harte et al, 2017). However, one recent study aimed to begin to address this gap through
investigating whether a directly instructed rule versus one that involved a novel experimental
derivation impacted persistent rule-following (Harte et al., 2017). Across two experiments,
140 subjects were either given a rule in which the key aspect of the rule (i.e. “least like”) was
derived from foreign words (Derived Rule Condition), or where this was directly instructed
without any need to derive it from foreign words (Direct Rule Condition). After being given
the  rule,  the  subjects  proceeded  to  a  MTS task  in  which  the  “least  like”  instruction  or
derivation was necessary for completing the task. In this task, participants had to match an
arbitrary  symbol  (sample  stimulus)  to  one  of  three  other  arbitrary  symbols  (comparison
stimuli)  using  the  “least  like”  instruction  or  derivation,  a  procedure  repeated  10  times
(Experiment 1) or 100 times (Experiment 2). Correct responding resulted in the provision of
one point, while incorrect responding resulted in the loss of one point. A control group was
included where the subject received similar training in derivation but was not given any rule
for the MTS task except the rule to gain as many points as possible. After the first 10 or 100
trials, the contingencies switched unbeknownst to the participants, meaning that the subjects
now received  points  for  choosing the  comparison stimuli  that  was  most  like  the  sample
stimuli, and lost points for choosing any other stimuli across a final 50 trials. Rule persistence
was measured by assessing how long subjects persisted with the previously reinforced rule
whilst  now losing  points.  Results  showed  that  participants  in  the  Direct  Rule  condition
persisted significantly longer than the Derived Rule Condition, but only when there were
more opportunities to follow the reinforced rule before the contingency switch (100 trials vs.
10).  Also, the persistent rule following in the Direct Rule Condition was associated with
significantly higher  stress  levels.  Taken together,  this  suggest  that  derivation  affects  rule
persistency, but only when coherence is high.
Rules  may also be analyzed regarding its  coherence,  that  is,  the stimuli  in  a rule
network may be more or less coherent with an individual’s previous learning history.  For
example, telling someone that smoking will make them long lived will probably be deemed
incoherent from the listener’s point of view, and would probably not lead to an increase in
smoking (Törneke, 2014). On the other hand, a more coherent rule, that accurately describes
a  problem,  could  facilitate  problem solving  behaviors  (Stewart  et  al.,  2016).  Therefore,
finding  coherence  within  a  problem,  i.e.  accurately  describing  the  relations  among  its
different  parts,  could  predict  efficient  problem  solving  and  therefore  reinforcement  (see
Mineka & Henderson, 1985).
 
The Present Study
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The current study aimed to extend the limited research bringing together RGB and
RFT  by  further  investigating  the  potential  links  between  dimensions  of  AARRing  and
persistent rule-following, specifically with respect to the coherence dimension and how this
may be linked to human psychological suffering. Based on the research conducted by Harte et
al. (2017), the key word in the rule that was provided for completing a contingency switching
MTS task was manipulated by varying levels of coherence. That is, this key word was either
part  of  a  relational  network that  was coherent,  or  a  part  of  a  network that  was partially
incoherent. A MTS task similar to that employed by Harte et al. was applied. The key purpose
of the experiment was to determine if participants persisted in rule-following in the face of
reversed  contingencies  and  if  this  rule-persistency differed  for  high  coherent  versus  low
coherent rules. In addition, a control condition, in which participants received an irrelevant
rule, was added for comparison with the two rule conditions. Lastly, a measure of general
psychological  distress  was  employed  to  examine  stress,  anxiety  and  depression  and  to
examine  whether  persistent  rule-following  correlated  with  these  dimensions  of  human
suffering. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, specific predictions were not made.
 
Method
Participants
216 undergraduate and graduate students  (138 females,  70 males,  5 others,  and 3
preferred  not  to  answer)  were  recruited  through  random  convenience  sampling  at  the
University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Their ages ranged from 18 to 57 years old (M range = 22
- 25 years) and 94,9 % had Swedish as their first language.
All participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions: High Coherence
Condition,  Low Coherence  Condition  or  Control  Condition.  The  Control  Condition  was
further divided into two conditions for counterbalancing. The data from 63 participants (27
from the High Coherence Condition, 24 from the Low Coherence Condition and 12 from the
two control  groups) were excluded because  they failed to  meet  the  specific  performance
criteria  described  subsequently.  This  left  an  N of  149  for  the  analysis  (47  in  the  High
Coherence Condition,  29 females, 17 males,  and 1 prefer not to respond; 50 in the Low
Coherence Condition; 28 females, 19 males, and 3 other; 23 in the Control Condition Faster,
17 females, and 6 males; and 28 in the Control Condition Slower, 20 females, 6 males, and 2
other).
Materials & Apparatus
The experiment involved one self report measure of psychological distress and two
computer-based tasks made in Qualtrics: a Coherence Task, and an Match-to-Sample Task
(MTS), and the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale -21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995).
Coherence Task. The aim of the Coherence Task was to train the participants in a
new relational network (A=B=C=D=E=F) and to allow them to derive the critical part of the
rule that would be needed subsequently for completing the MTS task. The Coherence Task
also  differed  in  the  degrees  to  which  feedback  was  coherent  for  participants  between
conditions. It consisted of 8 trials comprised of a task relevant trial-type (appearing 6 times)
and  two  task  irrelevant  trial-types  (appearing  one  time  each).  One  open-text  question
followed the fourth trial-type, the response to which participants had to manually input. This
sequence  was  as  follows:  1.  task  relevant  trial-type;  2.  task  irrelevant  trial-type;  3.  task
relevant trial-type; 4. task irrelevant trial-type; open-text question; 5. task relevant trial-type;
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6-8. task relevant trial-type in which feedback was manipulated between conditions. Each
trial-type comprised two or three short  statements,  a question,  and two or three response
options. The trial-types were either task relevant or task irrelevant. The task relevant trial-
types involved the key phrase that would be used in the rule (i.e. “LEAST LIKE”), provided
subsequently in the MTS task (see Figure 1, left-hand side). The task irrelevant trial-types
involved phrases that would not be necessary for completing the MTS task (see Figure 1,
right-hand side). All trial-types in the Control Condition were task irrelevant. Each trial was
also followed by a 7-point Likert scale in which participants were asked to grade how certain
they were about their answer, ranging from 1 (very uncertain) to 7 (very certain).
KROS is the same as ZID.
ZID is the same as LEAST LIKE.
What does KROS mean?
SAM is younger than TOM.
TOM is younger than PAT.
Which is the oldest one?
“MOST
LIKE”
“LEAST
LIKE”
“LEAST
LIKE”
“PAT” “SAM” “TOM”
Figure 1. The task-relevant trial-type presented to the High and Low Coherence Condition 
(left-hand side) and an example of a task-irrelevant trial-type (right-hand side) presented to 
all participants in the Coherence Task.
The first three task relevant trial-types included the first part of the network (A=B=C)
that participants were being trained on, and the last three task relevant trial-types included the
second part  of this  network (C=D=E=F; see Figure 2 for an illustration of this  complete
network per condition). The statements, question, and response options that comprised the
task relevant trial-type in the first part of the network (A=B=C) are presented in Figure 1
(left-hand side). This trial-type was denoted as task relevant because it enabled participants to
derive the meaning of the phrase “LEAST LIKE” from nonsense words which would then be
necessary to respond correctly in the subsequent MTS task. In the first statement, the word
“KROS” (C) was coordinated with the word “ZID” (B), and “ZID” was then coordinated
with “LEAST LIKE” (A).  Hence,  participants could derive that “KROS” meant “LEAST
LIKE”. Participants could select the options “LEAST LIKE”, “MOST LIKE” or “SAME”,
when  asked  “What  does  KROS  mean?”.  This  was  task-relevant  because  “KROS”  was
subsequently presented in the MTS task.
A = B = C = D = E = F (= D)
High Coherence LEAST LIKE = ZID = KROS = VEK = JUM =
PO
M
= VEK
Low Coherence LEAST LIKE = ZID = KROS = VEK = JUM =
PO
M
≠ VEK
Control FASTER/
SLOWER THAN = ZID = KROS = VEK = JUM =
PO
M = VEK
Figure 2. The relational network with the variation in different conditions defined.
One of the task irrelevant trial-types is presented in Figure 1 (right-hand side). This
trial-type was denoted as task irrelevant because nothing derived from it could be used to
inform responding on the MTS task. In the first task irrelevant trial-type, “SAM” was said to
be younger than “TOM”, and “TOM” was said to be younger than “PAT”. The participants
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were then asked which one is the oldest, and had a choice between the three names. The
second irrelevant trial-type was similar, except that the relations between the three stimuli
varied along the dimension of strength instead of age. The two task irrelevant trial-types were
included to allow the researchers to check that participants were deriving the relationships
accurately, rather than responding by trial and error.
The last  three trial-types  were task relevant,  but  were comprised of the last   four
stimuli of the network (i.e. C=D=E=F). This trial-type was denoted as task relevant because it
enabled participants to coordinate the nonsense word “KROS”, previously coordinated with
the word “LEAST LIKE”, with the rest part of the network (D=E=F), and to then use this
derivation to respond correctly on the MTS task. The feedback given in this last trial-types
were used as the manipulation in the experiment. In the first statement of the three last trial-
types,  the nonsense word “KROS (C) ” was coordinated with the nonsense word “VEK (D)”,
“VEK” was then coordinated with “JUM (E) ”,  and finally “JUM” was coordinated with
“POM (F)”. Hence, participants could derive that “JUM” was coordinated with  “KROS",
which was previously derived to mean “LEAST LIKE”. To respond correctly, participants
were required to  select  the “yes” response option,  when asked “Are VEK and POM the
same?”.
Figure 3. An example of a single trial and single stimulus set presented in the MTS task.
Note. MTS = match-to-sample.
MTS. The MTS task consisted of 150 trials. Each trial consisted of a sample stimulus
(random shape), presented at the top of the screen, and three comparison stimuli below (all
random shapes, but none identical to the sample stimulus or to each other; see Figure 3). Each
comparison  stimulus  varied  in  its  similarity  to  the  sample  stimulus  presented,  but  one
comparison stimulus was clearly most like the sample stimulus (see middle of Figure 3).
Another  comparison  stimulus  was  also  clearly  like  the  sample  stimulus,  but  had  more
variations in shape (see left-hand side of Figure 3), rendering it less like the sample than the
previous  comparison.  Finally,  the  third  comparison was  clearly the  least  like  the  sample
because it comprised a different shape, with little or no overlapping features (see right-hand
side  of  Figure  3).  Each  sample  stimulus  and  three-comparison  stimuli  in  combination
comprised an individual stimulus set, such that only those comparisons stimuli appeared in
the presence of a  specific  sample stimulus.  A total  of 54 stimulus  sets  were used in  the
experiment with each being presented at least once and no more than twice.
DASS-21.The Swedish version of the DASS-21 (Alfonson et al., 2017) is a measure
of general psychological distress and is comprised of three subscales measuring depression,
anxiety and stress. All items are rated on a 4-point scale from 0 (“Did not apply to me at all”)
to 3 (“Applied to me very much or most of the time”). Higher scores indicate poorer mental
health. The English version has demonstrated high internal consistency (Henry & Crawfoord,
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2005): depression (a =.82), anxiety (a = .90), and stress (a = .93).   The Swedish translation
has yielded similar sufficient internal consistency (Alfonson et al., 2017).
Procedure
The experiment involved three stages: the Coherence Task, the MTS task, the DASS-
21 questionnaire and demographics, and were always conducted in this order (see Figure 4).
The procedure is mainly a replication of the study made by Harte et  al.  (2017), with the
exception of the Coherence Task and variations in the MTS task.
Figure 4: Procedure flow chart. The order of the Coherencstask, MTS-task, DASS-21, and
demographics presented.
Note: Text in italic marks task irrelevant trial-types
To begin, participants had to fill in a consent form, accepting the conditions of the
experiment. Before starting the Coherence Task, the participants were told “You now begin
part 1 of 2. What you learn in the first part might be of help in the second part. You will
sometimes receive feedback on your answers and sometimes not”.
The  Coherence  Task. In  the  High  Coherence  and  Low  Coherence  Conditions,
participants received eight trial-types and one open-text question in the following order: task
relevant, task irrelevant, task relevant, task irrelevant, open-text question, task relevant, and
lastly, three identical task relevant trial-types. After the first two trial-types, all participants
received a reminder that “What you learn in this part might be relevant in the later part of the
experiment”. After the second trial-type, an open text box was presented in order to check if
the participants had derived the correct meaning of “KROS”, asking them to write in text
what KROS meant, based on what they had just learnt. Another purpose of this was to lower
the risk of potential  attrition.  The Control Condition was similar to the active conditions,
except  that  the  word  “LEAST LIKE” in  the  task  relevant  trial-types  was  replaced  with
“SLOWER THAN” or “FASTER THAN”. All trial-types in the Control Condition were thus
irrelevant to the rule that participants subsequently received on the MTS task.
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After  each trial-type,  all  participants were asked to grade on a  7-point  scale  how
certain they were about their answer, ranging from 1 (very uncertain) to 7 (very certain), in
order to strengthen the relations between the stimuli within the network.
Feedback was only given on trial-types six through eight, and the type of feedback
provided was manipulated between the conditions (described subsequently).
High Coherence Condition. The aim of the Coherence Task in the High Coherence
Condition was to allow participants to derive the critical part of a coherent relational network
(A=B=C=D=E=F) that would be subsequently used in the rule required for completing the
following  MTS task  (i.e.,  to  choose  the  comparison  stimuli  “LEAST LIKE” the  sample
stimulus).  When  giving  the  correct  response  in  the  last  task,  participants  in  the  High
Coherence Condition received feedback (i.e. “correct answer”), in order to create a high level
of coherence (see Figure 5, right-hand side). 
Figure 
5. Feedback in the two main conditions Low Coherence Condition (left-hand side) and High 
Coherence Condition (right-side) in the last three task-relevant trial-types in the Coherence Task.
Low  Coherence  Condition. This  condition  was  similar  to  the  High  Coherence
Condition, except that the feedback on the last three trial-types was incorrect even when the
correct  answer  was  given,  and  vice  versa  (see  Figure  5,  left-hand  side).  The  incorrect
feedback to the correct answer on the three last trial-tasks enabled participants to perceive
some part of the network as incoherent. However, the coherence of the whole network was
not violated since the incorrect feedback was only given to the more peripheral part of the
network,  resulting  in  C=D=E=F≠D,  with  participants  still  able  to  correctly  derivate  that
“KROS” is the same as “LEAST LIKE”.
Control Condition. In this condition, participants were divided randomly into one of
two conditions.  The trial-types  in  these conditions  were identical  to  the High Coherence
Condition except that the word “LEAST LIKE” was replaced with either “SLOWER THAN”
or “FASTER THAN” respectively. The group that received “SLOWER THAN” was referred
to as the Control Condition Slower while the group that received “FASTER THAN” was
referred to as the Control Condition Faster. This randomization was to counterbalance for the
possible implications within the MTS task based on the derived meaning of “KROS” within
the  control  group.  Therefore,  all  trial-types  were  task  irrelevant  as  none of  them helped
participants complete the following MTS task.
MTS. All participants were advised to try to gain as many points as possible in the
MTS task. Participants were informed that “In the next part of the experiment you will be
presented with a sample stimulus at the top of the screen and three target stimuli at the bottom
of  the  screen.”  All  participants  were  then  instructed  to  “Respond by selecting  the  target
stimulus that is KROS the sample stimulus.” Participants got positive feedback (i.e. “correct
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This was the last question:
KROS is the same as VEK.
VEK is the same as JUM.
JUM is the same as POM.
Is VEK the same as POM?
This was your answer:
YES
Feedback on the last question:
INCORRECT ANSWER
This was the last question:
KROS is the same as VEK.
VEK is the same as JUM.
JUM is the same as POM.
Is VEK the same as POM?
This was your answer:
YES
Feedback on the last question:
CORRECT ANSWER
answer”)  if  responding by choosing the least  like comparison stimuli  the first  100 trials.
Participants received negative feedback (i.e. incorrect answer”) if they chose either the almost
like or most like comparison stimulus. Participants were also informed that their total score
either increased or decreased by one point, depending on their answer. After 100 trials, from
MTS trial 101 to 150, the contingency switched unbeknownst to the participants, and they
now received reversed feedback (i.e. positive feedback when they chose the most like sample
stimulus,  and  negative  feedback  when  they  chose  the  least  like  or  almost  like  sample
stimulus).
DASS-21. Finally, participants completed the DASS-21.
 
Results
 
The strict accuracy criterions applied in Harte et al. (2017) was also applied to the
current analysis. First, participants in the High Coherence Condition and the Low Coherence
Condition were required to make at least 8 out of the first 10 responses correct on the MTS
task to be included in the analysis. This was to reduce the likelihood that participants learned
to match based purely on trial and error, and instead were able to apply the derived rule from
the first part of the experiment (the Coherence Task). The data from participants who did not
meet this accuracy criterion in the initial trials were excluded. This accuracy criterion was not
applied to the Control Condition since it was expected that few participants would meet it
(i.e. they had no rule to follow during their initial exposure to the MTS task). Nevertheless,
28,3 % of Control participants emitted at least 8/10 correct responses in the first 10 trials.
Second, as in Harte et al. (2017), participants from all three conditions were required
to achieve 80 out of the first 100 responses correct on the MTS task (before the switch in
contingencies).  This  was based on the  assumption  that  an  acceptable  number  of  Control
participants would have adapted to the contingencies across the first 20 trials (Harte et al.).
The data from participants who did not meet this accuracy criterion were excluded from the
analyses.  Additionally,  in  order  to  exclude  anyone  who  did  not  successfully  make  the
required  derivation  in  the  Coherence  Task,  participants  who  gave  an  inaccurate  (“NO”)
response to the last trial-task (i.e. “KROS is the same as VEK. VEK is the same as JUM.
JUM is the same as POM. Is VEK the same as POM?”) were also excluded from the analysis.
Before conducting the primary analyses, possible differences between the two Control
Conditions  as  a  result  of  the  “faster  than/slower  than”  manipulation  were  assessed.  5
independent t-tests were conducted to compare the means of all the relevant variables used in
the study (Rule Compliance-scores and Contingency Sensitivity-scores on the MTS described
subsequently), and Depression, Stress, Anxiety scores as measured by the DASS-21) between
Control  Condition  Slower  and  Control  Condition  Faster  (see  Table  1).  No  significant
difference in  mean scores  were  found,  ps  > .05.  Thus,  the two Control  Conditions  were
therefore merged and analyzed as one condition in the following analyses.
Analysis of Coherence
 
        In order to examine whether the primary manipulation resulted in different levels of 
coherence between the different conditions, the means of each conditions’ certainty scores in 
the last three trial-types in the Coherence Task  (i.e. in which participants were given different
feedback depending on which condition they were in) were calculated. A one-way between-
subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with condition (High vs. Low vs. 
Control) as the independent variable, and Coherence Task mean certainty scores as the 
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dependent variable. There was a significant difference in certainty found between the three 
groups, F(2, 145) = 14.72, p < .001, η2 = 0.17 (see Table 2). Post-hoc comparisons using 
Bonferroni corrections indicated that participants in the Low Coherence Conditions reported 
significantly lower levels of certainty than both the High Coherence Condition and the 
Control Condition, p < .001. There was no significant difference between the High Coherence
and Control Conditions. These results suggest that the manipulation of the feedback resulted 
in a greater level of uncertainty (i.e. coherence) in the Low Coherence Condition. 
Table 2
Effect of Condition on Self-Reported Certainty
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
a Self-reported level of certainty after Coherence task 6-8 (1 = “Not certain at all” to 7 = “Very 
certain”).
Analysis of Rule-Compliance and Contingency Sensitivity
Since the aim of the experiment was to compare performances between the High and
Low Coherence Conditions, the data from the 50 MTS trials, presented after the contingency
switch, were analyzed in two different, but related, ways (as in Harte et al., 2017). These are
referred to as RC (i.e. rule-compliance) and CS (i.e. contingency sensitivity).
RC was defined as the total number of responses out of 50 that was consistent with
the  rule  or  derivation  “LEAST  LIKE”/”KROS”,  but  inconsistent  with  the  reversed
contingencies for those 50 trials after the contingencies switch. Frigure 6 (left-hand side)
presents the mean RC-scores for each condition.  A one-way between subjects analysis  of
variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the mean total number of responses (out of
50) that were consistent with the rule/derivation, after the contingency switch between the
High Coherence, Low Coherence, and Control Conditions. There was a significant difference
in RC-scores between the three different conditions, F(2, 147) = 12.88, p < .001 ηp2 = 0.15.
Post-hoc comparison using Tukey's HSD indicated that the mean RC-score for the Control
Condition (M = 5.98, SD = 6.93) was significantly lower than the High Coherence Condition
(M = 21.34, SD = 20.26) and Low Coherence Condition (M = 18.62, SD = 18.26), ps < .001.
However,  there  was  no  significant  difference  in  rule-compliance  between  the  two  main
conditions, p = .68.
CS was defined as the point at which participants stopped following the initial rule
and began to respond in accordance with the reversed contingencies. In effect, it would more
accurately  reflect  early  CS  among  participants  who  subsequently  reverted  back  to  rule-
consistent  responding  after  a  small  number  of  trials.  Thus,  the  overall  number  of  rule-
consistent responses would remain high,  even though some participants may have shown
relatively rapid contingency sensitivity.  On balance,  some participants  might  have shown
random  or  occasional  rule-inconsistent  behavior  in  their  responding.  The  definition  of
contingency sensitivity used by Harte et al. (2017, p. 11) and employed here was “the point at
which responding in accordance with the reversed contingency emerged and did not return
reliably to a rule-consistent pattern”. This point was defined as “three or more consecutive
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Conditions
High Coherence
(n = 47)
Low Coherence
(n = 50
Control
(n = 51)
Total
(N = 148)
Mean Certainty Scorea 6.36 (.94) 5.43 (1.25) 6.43 (.83) 6.07 (1.12)
responses  in  accordance  with  the  reversed  contingency  followed  by  no  more  than  four
consecutive rule-consistent responses thereafter” (Harte et al., p. 11).
Rule Compliance
Total Numer of rule consistent responses  after contingency switch
Contingency Sensivity
Number of rule consistent responses before contingency sensitive responses
Frigure 6. Mean Rule-Compliance scores (left-hand side) and Contingency Sensitivity scores
(right-hand side) with standard error bars for the High Coherence, Low Coherence, and 
Control Conditions.
Frigure 6 (right-hand side) presents the mean CS-scores for each condition. A one-
way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare at which
point this occurred between the High Coherence, Low Coherence, and Control Condition.
There was a significant difference in CS-scores between the three conditions,  F(2, 143) =
11.02,  p < .001   ηp2 = 0.13. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD indicated that the
mean CS-score for the Control Condition (M = 6.88, SD = 6.75) was significantly lower than
the  mean  CS-scores  in  High  Coherence  Condition  (M =  21.00,  SD =  19.60)  and  Low
Coherence Condition (M = 18.22,  SD = 18.46),  ps ≤ .001. That is, participants in the High
and Low Coherence Conditions emitted significantly more responses in accordance with the
original  rule  than  the  Control  Condition  in  the  face  of  the  reversed  reinforcement
contingencies.  However,  there  was  no  significant  difference  on  contingency-sensitivity
between the two main conditions, p = .67 (see Frigure 6).
DASS-21
 
A Pearson’s correlation analysis was calculated among each condition, between reported 
levels of stress, depression, anxiety, CS-score, and RC-score for each condition. Three correlations 
were found to be significant, all within the Control Condition. RC correlated positively with stress (r 
= .35 p = .01) and anxiety (r = .33, p = .02) on the DASS-21, suggesting that greater rule compliance 
predicted higher levels of stress and anxiety. In addition, CS also correlated positively with DASS-21 
stress  (r = .33, p = .02), suggesting that less sensitivity predicted higher levels of stress (see Table 4).
Table 4.
Correlations between DASS-21, RC and CS-scores for Control Condition
Contingency 
Sensitivity
Stress Depression Anxiety
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Rule Compliance .98*** .35* .08 .33*
Contingency 
Sensitivity 
.33* -.04 .27
Stress .64*** .73***
Depression .43**
Note. * p < .05 ** p < .01. *** p < .001
In  order  to  assess  possible  effects  on  stress,  depression,  and  anxiety  that  each
condition  might  have  caused  participants,  a  one-way  between-subjects  ANOVA  was
conducted with condition (High vs. Low vs. Control) as the independent variable, and DASS-
21 mean scores (stress, depression, and anxiety) as the dependent variables. There was a main
effect  of  condition  on  levels  of  stress  F(2,  145)  =  3.54,  p <  .05,  η2  =  0.05.  Post-hoc
comparison using Bonferroni corrections revealed that participants in the Control Condition
reported significantly higher levels of stress (M  = 1.20,  SD = .63), compared to the Low
Coherence Condition (M = .88,  SD = .60),  p = .03. The High Coherence Condition did not
significantly differ from the other two conditions (M = .99, SD = .59), p > .05. There was no
significant differences found between the three conditions on reported levels of depression
and anxiety,  ps > .33. This suggests that the amount of self-reported depression and anxiety
the experiment itself might have caused the participants were equal in all three conditions.
That is, the significant relationship between increased rule-compliance and higher levels of
anxiety, found in the Control Condition, could not be explained by the absence of a rule that
was helpful.
Discussion
The primary purpose of the current research was to explore how different levels of
coherence in a rule may impact persistence in rule-following. The study failed to produce a
statistically significant difference with regard to whether different levels of coherence leads
to differences in rule persistence. However, the main conditions (High and Low Coherence)
persisted  significantly more  in  accordance  with  the  rule  than  did  the  Control  Condition.
While the coherence manipulation did not differentially impact persistence in rule-following,
the participants self-reports on their certainty of the network differed significantly depending
on which condition they were in. That is, participants in the High Coherence Condition were
significantly  more  certain  that  KROS  meant  "least  like"  than  participants  in  the  Low
Coherence Condition.
Interestingly,  the  present  findings  overlap  with  the  results  found  by  Harte  and
colleagues (2017), and since the MTS tasks were similar between the studies, some tentative
comparisons can be made. The conditions relatively high in derivation, i.e. the Derived Rule
Condition in the Harte study, and the two main conditions in the present study, resembled
each other quantitatively concerning both rule compliance and contingency sensitivity (the
present  study was  overall  high  in  derivation  since  nonsense  words  were  used  across  all
conditions to establish the rule network). While highly speculative, this can be said to add
further  evidence  that  higher  levels  of  derivation  is  connected  to  lower  levels  of  rule
persistence (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Hussey & Luciano, 2016). Since this study
manipulated levels of coherence when derivation could be seen as high, future work could
keep the levels of derivation lower, e.g. by only using previous known words.
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, predictions were not made beforehand.
Nevertheless, some theoretical assumptions can be made based on the findings. A possible
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reason the  main  conditions  did  not  differ  with  regard  to  rule-persistancy or  contingency
sensitivity could be because following the rule actually provided the participants with points
during the first 100 trials. This might have served to make the rule network more coherent
also in the Low Coherence Condition. More informally, when the rule actually succeeded to
provide  the  participants  with  points  (despite  being  strange),  the  participants  in  the  Low
Coherence Condition might have forgot about the previous strangeness of the rule network,
presented approx. 10-15 minutes earlier. The coherence in this condition can in one way be
claimed to be initially low, but then to gradually increase when being reinforced for following
the  rule  in  the  MTS task.  Thus,  at  the  time  of  the  switch,  it  is  possible  that  the  main
conditions had reached similar levels of coherence, even though this is speculative. One way
to control for this possible effect would be to have fewer trials in the MTS task.
Speculative  as  it  is,  this  alleged  increase  in  coherence  in  the  Low  Coherence
Condition might be interpreted as a preference for, and strive towards, coherence (Wray et al.,
2012; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). In a similar vain, other studies have found consistent
rule following to be related to increased levels of confidence, even when performance is poor
(Williams, Dunning & Kruger, 2013). Taken together, this could suggest that the incoherence
of  rules  is  easily  forgotten,  speculative  as  this  claim  is.  Future  studies  could  ask  the
participants about their certainty of the rule after its been reinforced several times, but before
the contingency switch.
Another possible explanation for the similarity between the main conditions could be
that the incorrect feedback given in the Low Coherence Condition did not directly challenge
the part of the network controlling the rule (A=B=C, i.e. LEAST LIKE=ZID=KROS). Thus,
it may be that the feedback did not propagate to the rule word KROS (meaning “least like”).
More informally, the participants could be said to have split the network in a coherent and an
incoherent part. Future studies could investigate what would happen if the coherence of the
rule word was undermined more directly. One potential way to do this would be to tell the
participants  in  the  Low  Coherence  Condition  that  the  A=B=C part  of  the  network  was
(sometimes) incoherent.
In comparison to  research demonstrating that  different  levels  of  derivation impact
persistent  rule-following  (Harte  et  al.,  2017),  different  levels  of  coherence  did  not
significantly affect either rule compliance or contingency sensitivity measures. Speculative as
it is, this might lead to two different conclusions: 1) coherence does not effect RGB to a
relevant extent, or 2) the level of coherence has to reach a certain level to have an impact on
RGB.
The  first  conclusion  is  supported  by this  study to  some extent,  which  may shed
interesting  light  on  RGB,  viz.  that  other  variables  than  coherence  may  be  relevant  in
explaining RGB. One possible  clinical  implication could be that  the therapist  should not
focus on establishing a maladaptive rule as incoherent, since that would not have the desired
effect (i.e. no effect at all). The therapist could instead work on adding new behaviors or rules
to outmaneuver the maladaptive ones. Another somewhat optimistic interpretation might be
that clients are prone to follow new rules, even though they seem to be incoherent with their
previous  knowledge or behavior.  This could be said to be in line with findings in social
psychology where people can act seemingly odd and immorally when simply instructed to do
so (Milgram, 1963; Zimbardo, 2007). 
The second tentative conclusion, that the level of coherence has to reach a certain
level in order to impact rule-governed behavior, might be a more reasonable conclusion based
on the results in this current study. Speculatively, this could be claimed to be in line with
newer conceptualizations in RFT regarding how clients can readily shift between different
sets, or networks of behaviors (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2018).
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Regarding the measures of mental health, a significant difference was found in the
Control  Condition  only,  where  contingency insensitivity  were  related  to  higher  levels  of
stress,  and  rule-persistence  were  related  to  higher  levels  of  stress  and  anxiety.  The
participants in the Control Condition received a rule that was useless in the MTS task. A
highly  tentative  interpretation  of  this  finding  is  that  being  shuttlecocked  between  first
following a malfunctioning rule, to subsequently derive a functioning rule that later on ceases
to  work,  but  is  anyway being  stuck  to,  is  associated  with  increased  stress  and  anxiety.
Perhaps,  this  is  because  they  derived  a  rule  more  strongly  related  to  themselves  in
comparison to the main conditions where a correct rule was given to them.
The  current  findings  could  be  compared  to  the  result  in  the  study by Harte  and
colleagues (2017), where participants given a direct rule that was subsequently abandoned
when ceasing  to  work  reported  significantly higher  levels  of  stress.  This  was tentatively
interpreted as disobeying a clear and well-established rule increases levels of stress. Contrary
to the present study, we found no significant increase in stress associated with abandoning a
rule when it ceased to work. On the contrary, the association found was between stress and
rule  compliance,  and  contingency  sensitivity  in  the  Control  Condition.  This  difference
between the studies could tentatively be explained by the fact that the control conditions
differed across the studies, since in the study by Hart et al., the participants in the control
condition did not receive a malfunctioning rule, but only a rule to gain as many points as
possible, somewhat more in line with traditional research on RGB where the participants in
the  control  conditions  responds  by trial  and  error.  The  participants  in  the  present  study
however received identical rules in the different conditions with the only difference being
having different meaning associated to the key word in the rule (i.e. KROS). Even though this
is a experimental strength, it obstruct comparisons with the Harte study.
Although this  research contributed to  preliminary insights  in the understanding of
RGB and coherence, five limitations in the current study should be noted. First, based on the
procedural issues mentioned in Harte et al. (2017), related to participants not being able to
transfer information from the Derivation Task (i.e. Coherence Task) to the MTS task, some
procedural changes were made in attempt to reduce the attrition rate. Procedural instructions
were added in this current study, reminding participants that the information in the first part
of the study (the Coherence Task) could be useful in the second part of the study (the MTS
task). Compared to the study conducted by Harte et al., this resulted in more equal numbers
of participants in the main conditions who were able to meet the inclusion criterias (64 % in
the High Coherence Condition were excluded, vs. 67 % in the Low Coherence Condition).
However, since the exclusion rate was still  considerably high, this has to be considered a
limitation.
Second, another limitation of the current research is the relatively narrow sample,
consisting of university students, from which participants were drawn. This might limit the
generalizability of the findings.
Third, a procedural issue in this current study was that accumulating points were not
displayed for the participants during the MTS task, which it was in the study by Harte and
colleagues (2017). This might have weakened the influence of the feedback, and aggravated
their ability to see their behavior in a broader perspective. That is, the direct feedback might
not  have produced the desired effect  and might  have lost  impact in  both reinforcing and
punishing functions.
Forth,  perhaps the incorrect feedback provided in the Coherence Task in the Low
Coherence Condition was not punishing enough to trump the participants sense of being right
on their answers. Maybe using a stronger punisher, like losing money, would increase their
sense of incoherence. However, the punishment in the Low Coherence Condition (being told
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they were wrong when they were actually right) was still strong enough to create significant
doubt within this condition, in comparison to the other conditions.
Fifth, to follow the procedure in Harte et al. (2017), the DASS-21 measure was taken
after participants completed the experimental tasks. Thus, it is possible that the difference in
reported levels of stress and anxiety were present before the experiment.
The  branch  of  Relational  Frame  Theory  and  RGB  has  contributed  separately  to
important aspects of psychology and human suffering. However, not until recently did these
fields begun to interact research-wise. Putting verbal behavior in the forefront, research is
now beginning to understand this previous gap in the literature concerning the core elements
in language and cognition. Even though this study is exploratory and many interpretations are
speculative, it adds insights to how humans are affected by the rules they (do not) live by and
the sense they are (not) making.
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